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Abstract
The aims of our paper are to identify economic determinants of the
on-farm cultivars diversity and to empirically characterize the farmers￿
diversi￿cation choices. We focus on the private decision making process
involving the choice of rice cultivars and the corresponding allocation of
farmland. For a speci￿c crop, the choice of cultivars, and the resulting cul-
tivars portfolio, involves the farmer comparing bene￿ts and costs. Among
the many costs involved, we focus on diversity￿ s management costs. Our
results rely on original data collected during the spring 2009 in the study
area, and involve a sample of 86 economic units growing rice. We es-
timated a count data model, in which the endogeneous variable is the
number of cultivars grown on the farm. After that, we studied the factors
explaining the portfolio choice in terms of commercial rice grain, and the
on-farm repartition between these di⁄erent types. A multinomial logit
model was used, with three alternatives, be specialized into a particular
type of rice grain (long or round), or grow simultaneously these two types,
or ￿nally be diversi￿ed with niche market varieties. And ￿nally we esti-
mated the percentage of long rice compared to the percentage of round
rice with a linear regression model. The results con￿rm the importance
of the interactions between market related bene￿t and the management
constraints on land and labor.
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1Introduction
During the last two decades, the erosion of biodiversity has been largely debated
in scienti￿c and international Conferences. In the same way, innovations and
technological progress in agriculture worldwide generated speci￿c concerns for
agro biodiversity erosion. For Smale, "the biodiversity of crops encompasses phe-
notypic as well as genotypic variation, including cultivars recognized as agromor-
phologically distinct by farmers and varieties recognized as genetically distinct by
plants breeders. Typically, farmers￿varieties do not satisfy International Union
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) de￿nitions of variety be-
cause they are heterogeneous, exhibit less uniformity and segregate genetically.
Where it is necessary to distinguish between varieties selected and managed by
farmers and those by professional plant breeders, the terms « landraces » and
« modern varieties are assigned".
Usually, the modernization of agriculture is meant as reducing genetic diver-
sity on-farm by specialization of farms in the most pro￿table crops and cultivars.
The process involves both the quasi disappearance of landraces and the concen-
tration of acreage around genetically homogeneous cultivars. As a matter of
fact, the increase of the number of cultivars released by the breeding sector does
not automatically involves signi￿cant increase in the genetic diversity, because
breeders are focusing their e⁄orts on the same crop￿ s traits. It is then necessary
to take into account allelic diversity to fully describe the process.
Analyzing the genetic (allelic) diversity of 96 Canadian oat cultivars released
from 1886 to 2001, Fu and al. found a signi￿cant decrease of alleles in cultivars
released after 1970. Moreover, they failed to detect signi￿cant diversity changes
among cultivars released from di⁄erent breeding programs or period (Fu, 2003).
This empirical evidence has been reinforced by the theoretical analysis of breed-
ers strategies elaborated by Ambec and al. (Ambec, 2008).
Heisey and al. (Heisey, 1997) elaborated an in-depth analysis of the costs
of genetic diversity. They emphasized the public good dimension of the genetic
diversity, and the dual meaning of the costs, either from the farm management
perspective, or from the social welfare viewpoint. The discrepancy between the
private and the social value of the genetic diversity of plant genetic resources is
the core issue of the conservation policies.
In this paper, we focus our analysis on the cultivars diversity and on the
private decision making process involving the choice of rice cultivars and the
corresponding allocation of farmland. For a speci￿c crop, the choice of cultivars,
and the resulting cultivars portfolio, involves the farmer comparing bene￿ts and
costs. Bene￿ts are induced by prices and yield di⁄erences. Prices for di⁄erent
grains commercial types often exhibit important gap, while yields often remain
comparable. As a consequence the cultivar portfolio structure appears to be one
important factor of the pro￿t distribution. Among the many costs involved, we
focus on diversity management costs. From a general economic point of view, the
issue is related to the concept of economies of scope, ￿rst elaborated by Panzar
and Willig (Panzar, 1981). "Whenever the costs of providing the services of the
sharable input to two or more product lines are sub-additive (i.e. less than the
2total costs of providing these services for each product line separately), the multi-
product cost function exhibits economies of scope". Economies of scope explicitly
posit the presence of a sharable, "quasi-public" input (from the view point of the
technology). The speci￿c issue we are dealing with, the on-farm management
of cultivars, involves another dimension, due to the allocatable character of the
land. Sharable or "quasi-public" input is the opposite of allocatable quasi-￿xed
input, which could not be shared by several lines of product or crops at the
same time. Allocatable ￿xed or quasi-￿xed inputs should be devoted to only
one line of product. As a matter of fact, these characterizations depend on the
technology used and on time frame considered altogether.
In the following, we will investigate the several lines of attack found in the
literature, then we will present the conceptual framework. The local context and
global empirical results will be presented. They rely on original data collected
during the spring 2009 in the study area, and involve a sample of 86 economic
units growing rice. We will ￿rst show the estimates of a count data model to
explain the number of varieties grown in the farm. Then we will focus on the
farmers￿choices regarding the commercial types of rice grain, with the estimate
of two models, a multinomial logit, to explain the specialization, or at contrary
the diversi￿cation choice mde by farmers, and after that, a linear regression
one, to better understand the substitutability choice between the two main
commercial types of rice grain.
1 Literature review
Diversity or greater scope provides bene￿ts, but also involves costly manage-
ment, because it is easier and cheaper to manage few items than more. The
sources of such a costly management of scope rest on several levels. Eco-
nomics of scale, competition and coordination costs, risk, agronomic constraints
(weeds management, salinity management, etc... The interactions between both
aspects (allocatable ￿xed input and costly management of scope) frame the
farmer￿ s choice of crops or cultivars.
Allocation of farmland to several crops not only involves comparing inputs
and outputs, but also management costs and constraints (Coyle, 1993, Liv-
ingston, 2008, Carpentier, 2009). Because farmland could be considered as a
quasi-￿xed input, and because the allocation of land to potential uses faces a
bulk of constraints (calendar and labour allocation, weeds management, salinity
management...), acreage decisions entail often a more or less diversi￿ed crop-
ping system. In the context of agricultural production, some agro-ecological
constraints could induce the need of rotating crops over the same plot, to avoid
for instance infestation by weeds or by predators. In that perspective, the
plot itself should be shared over time by several crops, and the plot becomes
a sharable input. By contrast, if the technology for controlling weeds through
chemicals is available and e¢ cient, it is possible to allocate plot to only one
crop, the most pro￿table one. In such a situation, the disappearance of agro-
ecological constraints turns the sharable input into one allocatable. With an
3allocatable ￿xed or quasi-￿xed input, it is always possible to share the total
amount among several products or crops, which is the so-called acreage deci-
sion. It is easy to understand that if no economies of scale exist, the ￿rm or the
farm will specialize in the most pro￿table product.
Two main approaches have been presented in the literature: the cost func-
tion, and the partial adjustment approaches.
Carpentier and Letort proposed to use the concept of "implicit management
cost" of the land allocation decision process (Carpentier, 2009). They intro-
duced the trade-o⁄ between the crop gross margins of the di⁄erent crops and
the "implicit management cost" of the chosen allocation, C(s). They proposed
to interpret C(s) "as a reduced form function approximating i) the unobserved
variable costs associated with a given acreage (energy costs,...) and ii) the ef-
fects of binding constraints on acreage choices, e.g. agronomic constraints or
constraints associated to limiting quantities of ￿xed inputs". The partial adjust-
ment approach is employed to account for adjustment costs and for constraints
on the present acreage choices. The decision is made at each plot level, with
reference to a long term choice of acreage shares, and the adjustment is made
by reference to the acreage shares during the preceding agricultural season.
Consider now a speci￿c crop, for instance wheat, corn or rice. The farmer
faces the choice of the scope of cultivars, and the level of the genetic diversity
of the crop chosen. Cultivars are designed to respond to di⁄erent needs or uses.
The rice cultivars are usually classi￿ed according to descriptive or technological
properties of the grain. Demand and prices for each speci￿c class depend on
the marketing strategies of the collectors and the industry. But neither of them
is completely specialized in a speci￿c category. Because they are few collectors,
each with slightly di⁄erent strategies, and because farmers are usually selling rice
to one or two collectors only, the structure of the demand is usually translated
from the market up to the farmers. As emphasized by Panzar and Willig,
this situation arises "from the failure of the market to sustain e¢ cient vertical
disintegration" (Panzar and Willig, 1981). Moreover, they are also endogenous
strategic considerations in keeping the supply balanced between di⁄erent types
of commercial grains.
Even if considering a homogeneous technology, the choice of the portfolio of
cultivars is formally analogous to the one of acreage decisions. For M. Pitt and
G. Sumodiningrat, "treating seed variety choice as ￿xed, as most studies do,
results in underestimates of (the absolute value of) input demand and output
supply elasticities...Di⁄erent pro￿t functions exist for each variety, re￿ecting
the di⁄erences in their biological technology. If seed variety choice is itself part
of the cultivators pro￿t-maximization problem, then there exists a single pro￿t
function- the meta-pro￿t function- which treat variety choice as a variable input
and from which all variety-speci￿c pro￿t function can be derived by treating seed
variety as ￿xed" (Pitt, 1991). The econometric estimation method they pro-
posed follows a three stage procedure, ￿rst estimating the seed variety switching
equation, then the pro￿t functions and the sets of inputs demand equation. The
speci￿c context (adoption of high yield variety in Indonesia) made the econo-
metric speci￿cation of the estimation procedure easier, relative to case studies
4where the number of cultivars is higher.
Raising the question of the determinants of millet diversity at the household-
farm level, in the Indian context, Nagarajan and al. proposed recently (Nagara-
jan, 2007) to use an ordered discrete choice model able to take into account up to
￿ve cultivars of millet. To pledge for the ordered probit forms they adopted, they
identify the latent variable underlying the choice of more variety as the index of
millet richness on-farm.
In the same vein, Benin and al.(Benin, 2004) , dealing with the two levels of
biodiversity on-farm, cereal crops diversity and intra-crop diversity, in Ethiopia,
observed that "a sample selection problem occurs because the diversity index for
cereal i exists only when the household cultivates the cereal". They also observed
that "a large proportion of households that cultivate a speci￿c cereal grow only
one variety so that both indices are censored at 0". Eventually, they proposed
to use the CLAD method (Censored Least Absolute Deviation). Finally, Park
and Florkowski (2003) present an adoption model for peach varieties. They use
a count data model, with a poisson regression, to explain the number of adopted
varieties.
2 Local context
The Camargue is a large area made of intricate ￿elds, marshes and lagoons
in and around the Rhone River Delta (South of France). It belongs to the
set of biodiversity hotspots around the Mediterranean Sea registered in the
Ramsar convention and also in the European Framework « Habitat, Fauna
and Flora » . The area has been recently accepted as part of to the « Man
and Biosphere » reserves network. Several local institutional arrangements for
managing water and biodiversity in the landscape have been ￿nally designed in
a context of con￿ icting interests (Water Local commission, and Parc Naturel de
Camargue). Wheat production and cattle are the main agricultural activities,
while various recreational activities, commercial hunting among them, provide
high income to landlords. The agricultural production is very intensive, but the
use of pesticides and herbicides is highly controlled by several administrative
regulations and collective institutional arrangements.
Irrigated rice growing is used to ￿ ush salt from the rootzone after some
years of dry farming. However the rice cultivars need to be adapted to the local
weather conditions (low spring and autumn temperatures, wind). Due to the
latitude, and the shorter vegetative cycle, it￿ s necessary to use more seeds per
hectare than in southern latitude. As a result, the production costs are high and
the average yields low. In the actual setting of the CAP, farmers are entitled to
unconditional payments varying from 400 to 1000 Euros/ ha.
Beside adaptation to local agro-ecological conditions, the choice of cultivars
is commanded by demand driven attributes, like the morphology of the grain
or the technological characteristics. Markets use a classi￿cation of grain in
categories like : Round, Long A, Long B, Medium, Colored and Perfumed. The
rice breeding is mainly controlled by Italian breeders, and as a consequence, few
5locally designed cultivars are found on local farms. Few (5) local rice collectors
are also seeds providers. They buy seeds in Northern Italy, and provide them
to their patrons in Camargue, in a context of one implicit joint contract linking
seed delivering and grain collection
There are no signi￿cant di⁄erences between the average yield of cultivars
belonging to a di⁄erent grain type. As a consequence, the price of seeds doesn￿ t
depend on this factor, but re￿ ects the di⁄erences in a price of the grain type they
are belonging to, a year before. When the market price falls, the farmer￿ s margin
is then reduced. After two years of high grain prices, the market dropped in 2009
to its level of years 2005￿2006. Speci￿c grains (like Ermes, Tam tam, Artemide,
Giano ou Lido) get a premium, whereas more common grain (belonging to Long
B category for instance) get the lower market price (See table 6 in appendix).
Naturally, the choice of grain categories grown by a single farm re￿ ects the own
constraints, costs and strategy and, as a result, the grain portfolio in each farm
results in a di⁄erent structure.
Location of the Camargue area and the surveyed farm
3 Data collection and processing
We surveyed farmers in Camargue during the spring 2009, and collected infor-
mation on the allocation of land they made in 2008 among several rice cultivars.
For each economic unit, made from one or more operational units (farms), we
6described the list of each cultivar grown, its acreage, and the quantity of seeds
used per hectare. We matched this information with that collected on the char-
acteristics of the farm during a choice experiments survey, Winter and Spring
2008 (Jaeck, 2009) . We eventually get a very rich data base on 86 economic
units, representing 10000 ha of rice, that is to say half of the total rice acreage
in the area.
3.1 Cultivars grown
In our sample, we identi￿ed 35 di⁄erent rice cultivars, but as a matter of fact,
few of them make up most of the rice acreage: Selenio, Arelate, Brio and Eurosis
constitute more than 70% of the total rice acreage in 2008 (see ￿gures 1;2 and
3 in appendix). Among the numerous cultivars with little area, some are old
ones, or are not suited to the market, and, for that reason, abandoned. Some
others are recently released cultivars, being tested by few or even one farmer.
In such a distribution, with a fat part and a thinly tail, we are able to recognize
the e⁄ects of a cultivar life-cycle. Finally, some cultivars correspond to a niche
market, and their acreages remain thin for that reason.
3.2 Farms￿economic performance
We elaborated the farm￿ s gross margin (FGM) indicator. We did di⁄erent com-
putations for conventional farms and organic producers. The distribution of the
farm according to their economic performance exhibits FGM ranging from ￿181
to 1414 euros. The median FGM is 602 euros. The main variables explaining
the di⁄erences in economic performance are the type of crop rotation used, the
level of yield and the allocation of land to di⁄erent commercial types of rice
grains.
7Figure 1. Distribution of farms￿gross margin (FGM)
4 Conceptual framework
Consider that the farmer faces the problem of allocating his land to K di⁄erent




sk = 1. The output obtained with the crop (or type grain) k
is sold at price pk . The quantity of seeds used is xk and the price for these
latter is denoted w. Each crop or cultivar gives a yield yk. So we can de￿ne the




[pkyk ￿ xkw] (1)
The decision-making process of allocation between the di⁄erent crops will imply
to taking into account a trade-o⁄ between the crop gross margins ￿k(pk;w) of
the di⁄erent crops on the one hand and the ￿implicit management cost￿of the





sk￿k(pk;w) ￿ ck + ek (2)
with ek being known to the farmer but random from the econometrician￿ s point
of view. Its expectation is normalized to zero.








The choice of cultivar portfolio appears to be one important determinant of
the gross margin distributionin the farmers population.
5 Econometric approach
5.1 Models speci￿cation and dependent variable
Our goal is now to identify the main drivers of the on-farm, intra-crop diver-
sity, and to estimate the parameters of the underlying function explaining this
choice. We could assume that the number of cultivars is a good proxy for the
diversity￿ s management costs: when these costs are high, the number of varieties
is expected to be low, and conversely, to be high when these costs are low.
We will ￿rst estimate a gamma model for counts, considering the number of
cultivars as a continuous dependent variable. We estimated such a model to
take into account the dispersion of the parameters revealed by the overdisper-
sion test obtained in the poisson model1.
In a subsequent stage of our research, we will seek to better understand the
on-farm acreage repartition choice between the di⁄erent commercial types of
rice grains. Let us specify here what these commercial types are. As we said
before, the rice grains are classi￿ed into six categories, Round, Long A, Long B,
Medium, Colored and Perfumed rice, based on agronomic and physical charac-
teristics. From a commercial point of view, we can retain three classes, Round,
Long (Long A and Long B), and Niche market (Medium, Colored and Per-
fumed)2. About the question of surface repartition between this various com-
mercial types, the reasoning is as follows: either the farmer devotes all his
acreage to a unique category3, or chooses to grow the two main rice grains (long
and round), or decides to have niche varieties4. So, we obtain a discrete choice
model with three alternatives. That￿ s why we will estimate a multinomial logit
model. Finally, we will improve this second step of our analysis by studying the
ratio of long varieties with regard to the round varieties5. We will thus estimate
a simple linear regression model to determine the factors a⁄ecting this on-farm
proportion.
1The results of the Poisson regression and the overdispersion tests are presented in appen-
dix, in table 5
2because these three last classes are all marginal in the rice market
3Farmers are always specialized either in long or in round rice, but never in the niche
varieties.
4The niche varieties are present in combination with the two main commercial types, except
for two farmers who only grow round rice with niche varieties.
5in terms of percentages of long and round varieties in the total acreage
95.2 Independent variables
We intuitively identi￿ed a set of factors having an impact on the on-farm diver-
sity6.
We suppose that the following assumptions imply a greater diversity :
- control of a greater acreage through the land concentration or the size of the
farm,
- to appoint more permanent workers,
- practicing short term rotation close to rice monoproduction,
- being involved in agro-ecological research and test various cultivars.
Whereas the following factors generate a lower cultivar diversity:
- managing or controlling a lower acreage
- managing vineyards or spring crops being substitutable to rice
- managing on-farm alternatives enterprises, like recreational activities in spring
or early summer
- being family (labour constrained) farm without wages workers
As complementary variables, we proposed also to take into account the name of
the grain collector and the geographical location, in relation to the probability
of occurrence of the salinity issue.
Table 1 presents the independent variables which will allow us to test our hy-
pothesis.
6by on-farm diversity, we refer to the number of varieties grown, but also to the diversi￿-
cation in terms of commercial types.
10variable description
BIO Percentage of total rice area of the farm in organic farming
SAURIZ Total rice acreage of the farm, in ha
NEXPL Number of farms managed by the farmer
MADAR Dummy variable that indicates if the farm sells its output to the enterprise
"Comptoir agricole du Languedoc"
MARAIS Percentage of total farm area used as marshes
SUDCEREA Dummy variable that indicates if the farm sells its output to the cooperative
"Sud CØrØales"
TOURTOUL Dummy variable that indicates if the farm sells its output to enterprise "Tour-
toulen"
STETHOMA Dummy variable that indicates if the farm sells its output to the enterprise
"SociØtØ Thomas"
PERSONNE Number of workers
ACTRECRE Dummy variable that shows the presence or not of recreational activities in the
farm
SUPERFIC Total acreage of the farm
TROUPEAU Dummy variable that shows the presence or not of cattle in the farm
ROTATION Percentage of rice in the rotation system
Z2 Variable e⁄ect coded that indicates if the farm is located in the zone 2
Z3 Variable e⁄ect coded that indicates if the farm is located in the zone 3
Z4 Variable e⁄ect coded that indicates if the farm is located in the zone 4
Z5 Variable e⁄ect coded that indicates if the farm is located in the zone 5
Table 1: Description of variables
6 Estimates and discussion
6.1 The number of cultivars
Examining the distribution of cultivars among farms in our sample, we observe
that the average number of cultivars per economic unit is 3:73, so close to 4.
The distribution is asymmetrical, with a maximum number of cultivars per farm
equal to 10. The distribution looks bimodal, with two peaks, one for 3 and one
for 2 cultivars.
11Figure 2. Number of cultivars
Count data results of the determinants of the number of cultivars are given
in table 2.
The estimate results are pretty good; the constant is 0:91, which is consis-
tent with the fact that all farms grow rice. The share of rice area under organic
technology management (BIO) is very signi￿cant, with a weak and negative co-
e¢ cient. The apparent contradiction with the negative impact of this parameter
is explained by the fact that only few rice varieties are suitable for organic farm-
ing, given farmers can￿ t use herbicides, so they need to have seeds that compete
well with the weeds. Farmers and specialists agree that only a few varieties have
this quality. As expected, the area given to the rice (SAURIZ) is signi￿cant, but
has little positive weight, whereas the number of farms managed (NEXPL) is
heavier and has a negative coe¢ cient. The coe¢ cient of SUPERFIC, the overall
area of the farm, is very low but signi￿cant. The two rice collectors in relation
with a greater number of varieties are TOURTOUL and STETHOMA, the ￿rst
one having a diversi￿cation strategy in its rice sales, and the last one being
involved in organic and niche paddy marketing. It is relevant to make here the
link between the number of varieties and the on-farm acreage repartition choice
made in terms of commercial rice grain. We can notice that farmers having niche
varieties correspond to diversi￿ed farmers, in all three commercial categories,
and with more than four varieties. So because of these reasons, this is a good
explanation of the positive coe¢ cients for TOURTOUL and STETHOMA, and
we understand better why farmers who sell their output to collectors adopting
such a market and commercial strategy can grow a higher number of varieties

















Dispersion parameter Alpha 2:57*** 0:648
Number of observations 86
Number of parameters 17
McFadden Pseudo Rho-squared 0:0757325
Model test 0:0000
*, **, *** means statistically signi￿cant at 90%, 95% and 99%
signi￿cance level
Table 2: Count model data model results for Number of Varieties
on their own farm. We see here the interactions between farmers￿production
choices and the ￿nal market, via the downstream ￿rms. Contrary to what we
expected, the number of permanent wage workers, (PERSONNE), the presence
of cattle or sheep (TROUPEAU) on the farm and the importance of the rice
in the rotation (ROTATION) are not signi￿cant in the choice of rice varieties
portfolio. The geographical location inside the Camargue area also appears also
to be not signi￿cant in the number of varieties adopted.
The dispersion parameter is signi￿cant, with a value higher than 1, that proves
an underdispersion of the distribution, that is variance lower than the mean.
6.2 The farmers￿choices for commercial types of rice grain
We study here the factors explaining the on-farm repartition choices between
the di⁄erent commercial types. We can observe that about one farm out of ￿ve
is specialized in only one category of grain7. The same proportion grows niche
varieties. The remaining farmers share their acreage between round and long
cultivars. So, this analysis of our data shows that farmers choose between three
7Among them, 50% are specialized in round rice and 50% in long grains.
13alternatives, be specialized, in round or long grains, be diversi￿ed but only in
these two categories, or be diversi￿ed with niche varieties. In order to explain
the farmers￿choice to be specialized or diversi￿ed, with or without niche, we
estimated a multinomial logit, with three classes.
Table 3 presents the results of this multinomial logit model. Structural
characteristics of the farm seem to be signi￿cant and a⁄ect the decision of being
diversi￿ed, with or without niche varieties, instead of specialized. Indeed, the
number of farms managed (NEXPL) appears to have a heavy negative in￿ uence
on the probability of being diversi￿ed, both with or without niche. This result
invalidates our hypothesis, but can be explained by the additional work implied
by the management of various units, and thus the specialization is a means
of not increasing this extra task. Size factors like SAURIZ or SUPERFIC
have only little impact on the choice of diversi￿cation. The surface devoted
to rice (SAURIZ) tends to increase the probability of belonging to the two
diversi￿ed classes. However, the total acreage of the farm (SUPERFIC) is
not signi￿cant for the niche varieties class, and has a very low but signi￿cant
coe¢ cient for the diversi￿ed class without niche varieties. Surprisingly, the sign
is once again in contradiction with our intuitive assumption, given a bigger
total acreage decreases the probability of growing both round and long rice. As
a matter of fact, this proves the existence of higher management costs due to
the bigger structure. The BIO coe¢ cients are weak but signi￿cant. Even if
this result can appear to be non intuitive, it can easily be explained. Indeed,
if the farm produces both conventional and organic rice, it is forced to grow
distinct types of varieties in each sector. As a matter of fact, the more the
farm has organic acreage (especially when all its surface is in organic farming),
the higher the probability of growing only one category of rice grain is. And
conversely, if the farm cultivates only a little part of its acreage in an organic way,
this would imply it being diversi￿ed, in order to distinguish the conventional
output associated with a particular commercial rice grain and the organic one, in
another commercial type. We understand why the BIO coe¢ cient for the class
with niche is more signi￿cant and a little bit higher, because of the fact that
organic farming is also a risky niche strategy, which competes with the other
niche varieties strategy. The presence of marshes and the number of workers
in the farm have both non signi￿cant coe¢ cients. However, the presence of
cattle or sheep on the farm highly increases the probability of growing various
rice commercial types. This result proves that farmers having cattle or sheep
are in a diversi￿cation strategy, both in activities introduce on the farm and in
commercial rice grains cultivated. Finally, the link with downstream ￿rms seems
to have an impact on the probability of growing several commercial types. We
gave explanations in the previous section. We know that "Tourtoulen" adopts
a diversi￿cation strategy and sells all commercial types on the rice market to
several customers, in France and abroad. That￿ s why we ￿nd a strong positive
correlation between the fact that a farmer sells its output to this enterprise
and his choice of being diversi￿ed. And, as we said before, the rice collector
"Thomas" has a niche strategy, which justi￿es the highly signi￿cant coe¢ cient,
and its great positive value, associated with the probability of growing niche














Number of observations 86
Number of parameters 24
Log Likelihood ￿47;20975
Prob (ChiSqd > value) 0:0000
*, **, *** means statistically signi￿cant at 90%, 95% and 99% signi￿cance level
Table 3: Parameters estimates of the multinomial logit model, with three classes,
for specialization (reference class), diversi￿cation with or without niche varieties
varieties. MADAR coe¢ cients are negative, that implies that the more farmers
sell their output to this ￿rm, the more they are specialized, either in round or in
long rice. Finally, the cooperative (SUDCEREA) seems to have no in￿ uence on
the probability that a farmer chooses to be diversi￿ed rather than specialized.










Number of observations 70
Number of parameters 9
Log Likelihood ￿132:2952
Model test 0:0002
Prob (ChiSqd > value) 0:0001
*, **, *** means statistically signi￿cant at 90%, 95% and 99%
signi￿cance level
Table 4: Linear regression model results for estimating the ratio Long/Round
We now want to study more in details the on-farm repartition choice between
long and round varieties. To do that, we focused on the proportion of long
varieties in total rice acreage in comparison to the percentage of round varieties,
which allowed us to calculate a ratio of these two values8. As a matter of fact,
the higher the ratio is, the higher the surfaces devoted to long rice, compared
to those allocated to round grain, are.
Table 4 presents the factors a⁄ecting this on-farm repartition choice between
the two main commercial types. We can observe that only few variables are
signi￿cant, proving the di¢ culty in de￿ning the determinants of the trade-o⁄
between long and round rice grains. Indeed, only three elements are signi￿cant,
with a positive coe¢ cient, so they imply that round varieties are substituted in
favour to long varieties. We ￿nd two structural determinants (NEXPL, ROTA-
TION), and once again a market one (MADAR).
8We omitted specialized farmers, and retained for this analysis only diversi￿ed farmers
167 Conclusion
Cultivars of the same crop represent a speci￿c level of the agro-biodiversity, in-
termediate between the species (crop) and the genes or alleles. For the breeders,
they are marketed products, designed to be suited for spe￿cic purposes, mainly
increasing and securing the yield. For the farmers, they are items to be managed
separately, at the plot level, because the shadow constraint and the di¢ culty
of managing cultivars mix. The choice of the cultivars diversity, the cultivars
portfolio, is in essence very similar to the choice of the crops portfolio and the
crops rotation design. It is in fact a secondary level of that choice.
On-farm cultivars management is one aspect among others of biodiversity
management. As such, it entails some speci￿c management costs. They arise
from the allocatable nature of the farmland, as an quasi-￿xed input, and also
from work￿ s constraints at the time of seeding and harvesting. But manage-
ment costs are balanced by the bene￿ts arising from the market advantages of
some cultivars, price premium or secure sales. As a matter of fact, the choice of
cultivars portfolio appeared to be one important factor of the heterogeneity of
farms pro￿ts. We performed a speci￿c survey in the Camargue Area, the Rhone
River delta, to characterize the rice cultivars diversity in the farms growing rice.
We identi￿ed 35 cultivars, which is pretty high and give empirical evidence of
the importance of niche markets strategies among rice growers. Because rice
growers are allowed to practice organic farming on a share of the farm, organic
farming appears to be part of such a strategy. Beside niche market strategy,
we identi￿ed farmers with low cultivars diversity, being as a consequence spe-
cialized in only one commercial grain type. They represent one out of ￿ve rice
growers.
We proposed to approach the reality of the cultivars diversity management cost
through the number of on-farm cultivars. We ￿rst estimated a count data model,
in which we explained the number of varieties grown on-farm. Then, a multino-
mial logit was used to analyze the diversi￿cation choice, in terms of commercial
rice grain types. The results are encouraging and con￿rm the importance of the
interaction between markets related bene￿t and the management constraints on
land and labour. Indeed, this study proves that the varietal portfolio choices
depend certainly on structural characteristics and constraints of the farm, but
also on market-driven variables. As a matter of fact, commercial networks and
opportunities play a key role in the diversi￿cation choice. However, the choice
of commercial type is a more complex decision making process, as we could
see in the last regression linear model we estimated, which showed that only
few structural and market factors are signi￿cant in the trade-o⁄ made between
round and long rice grain.
Our results con￿rm the importance of the relationship between farmers and
collecting ￿rms in the choice of cultivars portfolio. The hypothesis of implicit
contracts received a strong support from our estimates and investigating the
role of social networks and factors involving truth could shed more light on the
making of thoses contracts.
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Number of observations 86
Number of parameters 16
McFadden Pseudo Rho-squared 0:1240407
Model test 0:00169
Overdispersion test : g(￿i) = ￿i ￿8:189
Overdispersion test : g(￿i) = ￿2
i ￿7:201
*, **, *** means statistically signi￿cant at 90%, 95% and 99%
signi￿cance level
Table 5: Poisson model for counts results for Number of Varieties
8 ANNEX
8.1 Estimates of the poisson model for counts
According to Greene (2007), "under the null hypothesis of equidispersion, the
￿i and ￿2
istatistics have limiting chi squared distributions with one degree of
freedom". So, the values estimated (j ￿8:189 j and j ￿7:201 j ) must be compared
with the critical value from the chi squared table with one degree of freedom
(3:84). In our poisson model for counts results, the two statistics are higher
than this critical value, thus we reject the null hypothesis of equidispersion.
8.2 Seeds prices






















Round Cigalon 562 562 908 47 225 348
Centauro 660 675 883 61
Selenio 530 518 908 63
Ambra 680 582 930 58
Balilla 570 559
Brio 680 582 951 66
Long A Arelate 600 602 871 63 245 428
Ariete 640 675 1063 59
Opale 947
Sirbal 879
Augusto 610 580 879 52
Medium Lido 600 628 947 69 267 440
Loto 947 57
Long B Adret 654 654 63 255 289
Albaron 654 654
Gladio 640 710 1019 58
Tha￿bonnet 540 753 55
Table 6: Seeds Price by Grain Type and selected Cultivar/Source : Groupe Sud
CØrØales, Communication from D. Villenave
228.3 Description of our data
The ten ￿rst cultivars grown in Camargue, in surfaces and in
percentages
Varieties least grown in Camargue, in percentages of total rice acreage
23The other varieties grown in camargue, in percentages of total rice acreage
24